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INTERFIRM CO-OPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
DISCONTINUOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The case of the UK optical communications systems industry 
 
Introduction 
Technological discontinuities such as biotechnology and digital wireless communications 
shake the competitive environment, destroy the basis of established competitive advantages 
for incumbents, and open up opportunities of strategic renewal by building new competitive 
positions1. However, they do not necessarily imply the demise of incumbent firms. A 
growing body of evidence indicates that, in their battle against aggressive new-entrants, 
incumbents can and do survive2. In some cases, such as in the case of high-tech multi-
technology industries, the end result of discontinuous technological change is a “symbiotic 
co-existence” of old and new firms3.  
 
The co-existence of incumbents and new-entrants can be partially explained in terms of the 
impact of discontinuous change on both technological and ‘complementary’ competences 
within the same industry4. More specifically, technological discontinuities can 
simultaneously have competence destroying and competence enhancing effects for incumbent 
firms5. Christensen, for example, found that trajectory disruptive architectures tend to be 
developed in new, emerging market segments, whereas trajectory-sustaining technologies are 
first used within mainstream markets6. Rothaermel found that in high-tech multi-technology 
industries, radical technological change destroys competences that relate to an incumbent’s 
upstream value-chain activities while enhancing competences that relate to its downstream 
value-chain ones, especially those that are necessary to successfully commercialize the new 
technology7. 
 
This paper analyses the role of co-operative strategies for both incumbents and new-entrants 
in shaping the industry competitive context in the wake of a technological discontinuity. As 
shown by Rothaermel, discontinuous technological change can also initiate a process of 
‘creative’ co-operation. Incumbent firms use co-operative strategies – typically with new-
entrants - to establish their technologies as the dominant standard and expand their consumer 
base. At the same time, some of the start-ups specialize into new sub-fields, so that the 
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industry splits into quite separate competitive arenas.  Incumbents and new-entrants end-up 
coexisting within the same industry in different networks of co-operative relationships8.  
 
Rothaermel’s most recent work concentrates on incumbents’ performance and on co-
operation between incumbents and new-entrants9. But the issue of co-operative strategies as 
firm-level responses to technological discontinuities is wider. The contribution of this paper 
is to develop our understanding of the relationship between radical technological change and 
co-operative strategies by providing an answer to two fundamental questions: 
 
1. What types of co-operative strategies emerge in the wake of a technological 
discontinuity? 
2. Are there any similarities (or differences) in the behaviors of incumbents and new-
entrants with respect to the type of co-operation? 
 
This paper presents the results of a research study on co-operative strategies in the UK fibre-
optics industry between 1992 and 1997. It shows how the competitive flux created by the 
emergence of fibre-optics as potential substitute to copper-based technology in 
communications is compounded by the slower than expected progress of the new technology. 
In the midst of this unresolved technological battle, both incumbents and new-entrants 
adopted co-operative strategies of one of two types, respectively labeled here as structured 
and unstructured co-operation. Structured co-operation is characterized by the development 
of highly engineered partnerships at the inter-organizational level, whereas unstructured co-
operation is highly dependent on the development of personal relationships between 
individuals in different organizations. 
 
The paper highlights two key findings. First, not only old and new firms co-exist within the 
same industry – albeit in quite different competitive arenas - but also old and new 
technologies can (and often do) co-exist within the same firm. This has major implications 
for the type of market strategy pursued by individual firms. A second, counter-intuitive 
finding is that being an incumbent or a new-entrant does not entirely explain the type of co-
operative strategy adopted by a firm. Two interrelated factors appear relevant for this choice. 
The first is the strategic driver of the firm, which distinguishes between demand-pull versus 
technology-push strategies10. The second is the degree of flexibility of the firm, which 
includes both technological and organizational dimensions11. 
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 In the following section the theoretical background for the study will be briefly introduced. I 
then proceed by illustrating the fundamental characteristics of fibre-optics that make this 
industry an interesting field for addressing the research questions.  After presenting the 
research methodology I illustrate the major findings and discuss them in the light of the 
existing theoretical and empirical contributions. Finally, I reflect on the implications of the 
study for both managerial practice and theory. 
 
Exploring the relationship between technological discontinuity and co-
operative strategies 
Three bodies of literature mainly contribute to our understanding of the relationship between 
discontinuous technological change and firm-level responses, in the form of co-operative 
strategies – namely, the economics of technological change, innovation studies, and strategic 
management. 
 
In the field of the economics of technological change, early contributions by Freeman and by 
Rozenberg show that discontinuous technological change is not homogeneous in terms of its 
nature and impact for existing firms and their strategies12. The subsequent realization that a 
technological discontinuity can have both competence enhancing and competence destroying 
effects constitutes a fundamental step forward for analyzing how incumbent firms can survive 
the ‘gales of creative destruction’13 that sweep industries from time to time. 
 
Building on Henderson and Clark’s classification of innovations – based on the degree to 
which innovations reinforce or make obsolete firms’ expertise – many contributions in the 
fields of the economics of technological change and innovation studies have tried to 
understand and clarify the options available to both new-entrants and incumbents14. For 
example, works by Mitchell, Pavitt and Rothaermel have shown how incumbents, in 
particular, can rely on enhanced competences and architectures to defend their competitive 
positions and take advantage of radical technological changes15. Rothaermel’s work also 
highlights the importance of co-operation in shaping competition in the wake of a 
technological discontinuity. Incumbent firms, in particular, use co-operative agreements with 
new-entrants to establish their technologies as the dominant industry standard and, 
consequently, to expand their consumer base. At the same time, some of the start-ups 
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specialize into new sub-fields and concentrates on the most advanced niches of the market, so 
that the industry ends up split into quite separate competitive arenas16.  
 
These findings are consistent with Christensen’s analysis of the rigid disk-drive industry17. 
Christensen shows how the leading disk drive manufacturers reacted to radical changes in 
technology and the markets and points out that the most successful incumbents were those 
who developed the new technologies to address their (traditional) mainstream customers’ 
needs. New entrants, on the other hand, concentrated on emergent market segments, with 
significant implications for the future development of the technology, and the industry as 
well. 
 
From the strategic management point of view, a firm’s survival in the long term is dependent 
on the sustainability of its competitive advantage in the face of a changing environment. The 
analysis is here limited to the more adaptive perspectives in the strategy field, and, more 
specifically, to the Resource Based View18. The main argument of the Resource-Based-View 
of the firm states that a firm’s resources and competencies are the basis of its competitive 
advantage and that isolating mechanisms are the pillars of sustainability19. But capabilities 
have a dark side, and core rigidities make change a difficult task20. The more radical the 
change, the more difficult the task for incumbents because of core-rigidities effects. As Grant 
points out, in responding to a radical change in an industry “whereas new firms are faced 
with the challenge of acquiring entirely new capabilities, established firms are faced with the 
dual challenge of acquiring new capabilities and dismantling existing obsolete capabilities”21.  
 
However, although faced with a very difficult task, incumbents are by no means doomed to 
failure. How can they survive? In the field of strategy, a perspective that complements the 
Resource Based View in understanding firms’ options in the face of radical change and 
explaining long-term survival has recently developed under the name of Relational View of 
the firm22. The Relational View of the firm is based on the key assumption that a firm’s 
critical resources can span its organizational boundaries and be embedded in interfirm 
relationships. The recognition that competitive advantage depends on inter-organizational 
relationships contributes to our understanding of firms’ survival in the face of radical 
technological change. It, in fact, highlights how the typical advantages associated with co-
operative strategies23– such as increased flexibility, access to complementary resources, and 
learning – might be relevant for both incumbents and new-entrants and could partially 
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explain the predominance of one or the other in the face of radical technological change. Co-
operative strategies, in other words, contribute towards the sustainability and the creation 
alike of competitive advantage. The former is crucial for incumbents; the latter is crucial for 
both incumbents and new-entrants.  
 
To summarize, all of the three theoretical perspectives above - the economics of 
technological change, innovation studies and strategic management – do not discount the 
possibility that incumbents and new-entrants might co-exist in the wake of a technological 
discontinuity, and that co-operative strategies play a potentially significant role in achieving 
this outcome. Starting from this recognition, the present paper concentrates on the types of 
co-operation adopted by incumbents and new-entrants as firm-level responses to radical 
technological change, and on their similarities (or differences) with respect to co-operation. 
 
Fibre-optics: substitute or complementary? 
Opto-electronics is a revolutionary technology, an example of “scientific fusion” which 
“exemplifies the merging of optical and electronic properties at the atomic level”24. It is also 
a classic example of major technological discontinuity. In terms of end-markets, opto-
electronics is a core technology for a number of different industries, notably communications, 
information systems, consumer electronics, aerospace, military and medical. In general terms, 
however, it is possible to distinguish between two main types of applications. The first is 
industrial and consumer electronics, which has dominated in countries such as Japan; the 
second is optical communications, which has constituted the main driver for technological 
development in the UK.  It is this second area of application that lies at the centre of the 
present study. 
 
The development of opto-electronic technology in communications has been characterized by 
two ‘technological bottlenecks’ – increasing transmission capacity and increasing 
transmission distance – and four main phases. The first phase (1960s and first half of the 
1970s) coincides with the emergence of optical communications as a potential reality. The 
difficulty in producing low-loss (that is, high-quality) fibres is paralleled by steady progress 
in the development of suitable sources of light. During the second phase (mid-1970s to mid-
1980s) this bottleneck is removed thanks to the development of successive generations of 
fibres. Progress in the development of other components – particularly sources of light – is 
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also achieved and optical communications becomes a reality. The third phase (mid-1980 to 
early 1990s) is mainly characterized by issues related to the commercialization of the 
technology in the market. Great emphasis is also put on lowering the manufacturing cost of 
key components in order to enhance diffusion. 
 
This becomes the dominant theme for the fourth phase. In theory the fourth phase should 
coincide with the emergence of fibre-optics as the dominant technology in the industry and 
the complete demise of the old copper-based technology. The reality, however, shows a 
different picture, one that has been recently depicted as “the slow progress of fast wires”25. 
 
From a technological point of view, the fundamental difference between optical and copper-
based communications is that in fibre-optic cables information is carried by means of light 
beams whereas electrical current is the carrier in conventional copper cables. The decisive 
advantage of optical communications over more conventional forms lies in the different 
carrying capacity of optical and metallic cables. Other advantages follow as shown in Table 
1. Judging on the basis of pure technological characteristics, there is little doubt that fibre-
optics should entirely replace copper-based technology in communications.  In the early 
stages of the diffusion of fibre-optics in the marketplace, the technological superiority of the 
new technology above traditional copper generated a strong expectation that ‘fibre-to-the 
desk’ would become a reality in a not-so distant future. Substitution was not in question, and 
it would happen soon. But a few years down the line a different picture has emerged.  ‘Fibre-
to-the desk’ has not become a reality, and some people have started doubting that it will in 
the near future. More than that, some have started doubting that it should. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
What has provoked this significant change in the expected outcome of the technological 
battle between copper and fibre-optics? On closer scrutiny, a combination of factors have 
delayed the diffusion of fibre-optics and prevented its emergence as the new industry 
standard26. Fist of all, the intrinsic complexity of the technology, and the presence of 
significant ‘interdependencies’27 constitute natural obstacles to rapid commercialization. 
 
The second factor is connected to cost and infrastructure problems. For fibre-to-the desk to 
become a reality, a few pre-requisites need to be met. One is cost-related. There is a linkage 
between the rate and pace of diffusion of the new technology and its cost. If the cost does not 
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come down significantly with volume increases, the diffusion may come to a halt as well. In 
the case of fibre-optics, the cost of some components has decreased significantly (for 
example, fibre-optics cables are in themselves a mature product) but in other areas costs are 
still relatively high. This is partly related to the second pre-requisite. A capillary diffusion of 
optical communications systems needs huge investments in infrastructure. For example, for 
Local Loop or Subscriber connections to be available, wider networks (LANs, MANs, and 
like-such) need to be put in place.  Delays and cost-related problems at the infrastructure 
level affect the economic viability of more localized systems.  
 
The third factor is that firms with huge investments in copper-based technology have reacted 
to the substitution threat on two fronts. On one hand, they have intensified their efforts in 
innovation in the traditional copper-based technology. Metallic cables, for example, have 
dramatically improved their performance and can still benefit from cost and infrastructure-
related types of advantages.  On the other hand, incumbent firms have diversified into opto-
electronics with the dual objective of controlling the diffusion of the new technology and, at 
the same time, avoid rapid cannibalization of the old. 
 
In brief it is possible to summarize the situation of the UK optical communications systems 
industry at the time of the study as follows. Optical communications is by any means a 
technological discontinuity, and the theoretical advantage of the new technology is so strong 
that it might be considered as a substitute. In reality, however, a combination of factors -
technology-related, infrastructure and cost-related, and, firm-related ones - have halted the 
emergence of fibre-optics as the dominant standard in the industry. Fibre-to-the-desk is not a 
reality, and the majority of optical communications systems are based on a combination of 
copper-based and optical technology. For example, in a typical LAN application such as 
providing access to an industrial park, fibre-cables could be used to connect different 
buildings, and metallic ones could be used to extend the network to each individual terminal 
or desk within the a building.  In other words, these two potentially substitute technologies 
have become complementary. 
 
Methodology 
The research focused on the development of co-operative inter-firm relationships in the UK 
communications systems industry. The emergence of opto-electronics constituted the 
 8
technological discontinuity at the center of the study. This included both incumbents and 
new-entrants28 and, more specifically, analysed co-operation between manufacturers and 
installers of optical communications systems. A schematic structure of the industry supply-
chain at the time of the study is in Figure 1. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The target population for the empirical research consisted of all UK firms involved in 
manufacturing and/or installation of optical communications systems. These are firms whose 
core activity is to provide end-customers with the necessary ‘hardware’ for fibre-optics 
communications. The big systems operators, who provide end-customers with the actual 
service, were therefore excluded alongside firms exclusively involved in distribution of 
hardware components. Formally independent firms, UK subsidiaries of multinational groups, 
as well as divisions of bigger companies for which it was possible to collect specific data, 
were included in the sample. The sampling frame was obtained combining three existing lists 
– respectively provided by the Fibre-optics Industry Association (167 corporate members), 
the Fibre-optics, Lasers, and Opto-Electronics Directory (126 companies), and the list used 
by Brown and Hendry 29 for their comprehensive survey of the UK fibre-optics industry. The 
total sample consisted of 132 firms. 
 
The choice to concentrate the study on co-operative relationships between manufacturers and 
installers of optical communications systems is justified both theoretically and empirically. 
The theoretical rationale lies in the idea that the process of creative co-operation that follows 
a technological discontinuity is related to the relevance of up-stream and down-stream 
activities in the incumbents’ value chains30. The empirical one lies in the fact that the 
relationships between manufacturers and installers is particularly critical in this industry, 
given that installers represent an essential link-pin between demand – that is, customers’ 
needs – and supply – that is, available technology and offer. 
 
Data collection included both secondary and primary data. Secondary data consisted of extant 
literature and publicly available data on the industry. Primary empirical data were collected 
by means of survey and interviews, mainly carried out in the year 1998. A total of 53 
questionnaires were returned, of which 41 usable for analysis purposes giving a response rate 
of 31%. A preliminary analysis indicated no major bias in favour of specific categories of 
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respondents in terms of size (measured by means of annual revenue and employees) or 
primary activity (that is, manufacturing or installation). 
 
The survey instrument was adapted to capture the different perspectives of manufacturers and 
installers - the two ends of the relationship under study - but the questions covered identical 
fields and mainly concentrated on the nature of inter-organizational relationships at this 
particular level of the supply-chain. A number of indicators were used to measure co-
operation. Some were empirically based, such as the length of the relationship, the number of 
suppliers/distributors, and the use of practices that limit access to suppliers and distributors. 
Others were more theoretically based. An extensive analysis of the new institutional 
economics, strategy and organization theory literatures31 on the development of co-operative 
inter-organizational relationships led to the identification of six ‘critical’ areas.  These 
broadly relate to aspects of co-ordination, commitment and information exchange, and 
governance – in particular, control and conflict resolution - and are summarized in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
These measures were used to create an initial map of the different types of co-operative 
behaviours adopted by manufacturers and installers in their reciprocal dealings. Subject to 
further analysis, they also provided the basis for the identification of more general patterns of 
co-operation between manufacturers and installers in the industry. This led to the 
identification of two main approaches to – or strategies of - co-operation, which are described 
in the following section. 
 
The results 
The analysis of the research data led to two main results. The first is empirical evidence to 
confirm how old and new technologies can co-exist within the same industry - in different 
organizations - but also within the same firm - if not always in the same proportion. This has 
important implications for firms’ strategies. The second is that two ideal-types of co-
operative strategies can be identified at the level of the industry supply-chain under study, 
respectively labeled here structured and unstructured co-operation. These findings will be 
illustrated in detail in the remaining part of this section. 
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The co-existence of copper and optical technologies 
What impact did the fibre-optics revolution have on firms’ strategies and, more specifically, 
in terms of their choices of markets and core technology? What were its implications for the 
industry supply-chain? When fibre-optics emerged as a potential substitute for copper-based 
technology, the incumbents reacted by diversifying into the new technology. Incumbent 
manufacturers were typically large firms, with huge investments in copper technology that 
could not be easily re-deployed. A radical change in strategy was very difficult, and, given 
the opportunity, these firms adapted by concentrating their efforts on serving their old market 
– the market for standard applications characterized by large volumes, high rates of growth 
and mainly large, non-sophisticated customers – with a combination of old and new 
technologies. They became ‘general manufacturers’. In terms of technology development, 
these firms put a lot of effort in improving copper technology, and this stimulated a series of 
innovations that made copper significantly more competitive. On the other hand, they rapidly 
developed new competencies in fibre-optics, and tried to strike a balance between the two so 
that the new would not cannibalize the old too quickly. 
 
Incumbent installers, on the other hand, could change their strategy more easily. They did not 
have the strain of huge non re-deployable investments in copper and with this stronger 
flexibility came the possibility to redefine their overall strategy in terms of both markets and 
technologies. Some firms actually kept faith to the old ways, more specifically to their old 
markets, and became ‘general installers’. Others decided to concentrate more heavily on the 
new technology and specialized in the more sophisticated types of applications. In other 
words, they reinvented themselves as technology-driven, ‘specialist installers’. 
 
Significant differences were also observed amongst new-entrants. These were soon 
confronted with the difficulties encountered by fibre-optics in its diffusion in the market, and 
with the defensive reaction of the incumbents. New-entrant manufacturers mainly directed 
their efforts towards specialist niches of the market, whereas new-entrant installers chose one 
of two alternatives. They either concentrated their efforts on the mainstream market for 
standard applications – therefore becoming ‘general installers’ – or pursued a very focused 
niche strategy – therefore becoming ‘specialists’. 
 
These developments can be summarized in a matrix (see Figure 2) that classifies 
manufacturers and installers of fibre-optic communications systems in terms of two 
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dimensions. On the one hand, their intrinsic nature of incumbents or new-entrants, which 
crudely summarizes both organizational and technological competencies; on the other hand 
their choice of strategy. Even if a combination of old copper and new fibre-optics is still 
necessary for keys-in-hand communication systems, individual firms’ strategies can differ in 
terms of the relative combinations of market/technology served. In other words, they can 
follow a predominantly demand-pull strategy centered on mainstream markets or, alternately, 
a predominantly technology-push one, concentrating on specialist niches. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Structured and unstructured co-operation 
The development of co-operative strategies between UK manufacturers and installers of 
optical communications systems is a response to the altered competitive circumstances 
brought about by the fibre-optics revolution. Incumbents and new-entrants both benefited 
from increasing levels of co-operation. Incumbent manufacturers and installers adopted co-
operative strategies to take advantage of the enhancing effects of the technological 
discontinuity on, respectively, their downstream and upstream activities. For new-entrant 
manufacturers and installers co-operative strategies were part of a wider entry strategy, and 
played a significant role in overcoming the difficulties posed by the slower than expected 
diffusion of the new technology in the market.  
 
By analysing the patterns of co-operative behaviour captured in the survey, two ideal-types of 
co-operative strategies were identified and named, respectively, structured and unstructured 
co-operation. A comparison between the two, based on the key six areas identified in the 
methodology section, is shown in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
At the time of the survey, relationships between manufacturers and installers of optical 
communications systems show many co-operative features, and specific questions in the 
questionnaire on the trend of the previous five years – between 1992 and 1997 - corroborate 
the idea that co-operation was on the increase. This is confirmed by qualitative data from the 
interviews and the case studies32, which also support the view that the adoption of co-
operative strategies is connected to the specific competitive circumstances following the 
emergence of fibre-optics and its co-existence with copper technology. In other words, the 
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slow progress of fibre-optics and the resilience of copper technology are strongly associated 
with the emergence of co-operative strategies at a critical level in the industry supply-chain. 
 
Structured or unstructured co-operative strategies? 
The results from the survey and the case studies are consistent with previous findings in 
suggesting that, in the wake of the fibre-optics revolution, UK firms tend to operate in two 
separate competitive arenas33. The first is the wide mainstream market for standard 
applications, characterized by large volumes; high rates of growth; non-sophisticated, mainly 
large, customers, and (primarily) price-based competition. The second arena is the realm of 
specialist applications and comprises a collection of niches where particular needs are catered 
for. These can be connected to special characteristics of the end-customers - for example in 
the case of small and medium firms with little knowledge of the technology - or to special 
characteristics of the applications – for example, when sophisticated applications are 
requested by equally sophisticated end-users such as the military and aerospace. In these 
niche markets, price is not so relevant whereas being at the leading edge of technological 
development is.  The ability to provide tailor-made solutions, to advice and counsel 
uneducated customers in their technological choices, and to communicate with sophisticated 
users on an equal footing are all necessary attributes to be successful in niche markets and all 
require a strong focus on the technology. The constant expansion in the number of 
applications of optical technology across different fields provides ample opportunities for 
growth (and also new entries) in this arena, but growth in itself is not necessarily a strategic 
priority for individual firms.  
 
The identification of structured and unstructured co-operative strategies answers the first 
research question, but what can be said about potential similarities (or differences) between 
incumbents and new-entrants with respect to co-operation? In other words, which firms 
adopted structured co-operation, and which choose unstructured co-operation instead?  
The most counter-intuitive finding of the study is that the position of incumbent or new-
entrant does not entirely explain the type of co-operative strategy chosen by UK 
manufacturers and installers of optical communications systems, neither does their own core 
activity – that is, mainly manufacturing or installation.  
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The type of co-operative strategy adopted by manufacturers and installers of optical 
communications systems is, instead, linked to two interrelated factors – namely, the key 
strategic driver of the firm and, its degree of organizational and technological flexibility. The 
key strategic driver of the firm spans between, on the one hand, growth in terms of volume in 
mainstream markets for standard applications – a strategy earlier defined as market-pull, and, 
on the other hand, growth in terms of diffusion of the technology across different specialist 
niches – a strategy earlier defined as technology-push. The degree of organizational and 
technological flexibility of the firm is only partially captured by the intrinsic characteristic of 
incumbent or new-entrant. Other structural factors – such as, for example, the importance of 
sunk costs and the possibility to re-deploy existing investments –play a fundamental role. 
Figure 3 summarizes the positions of different industry participants (manufacturers and 
installers of optical communications systems; incumbents and new-entrants) with respect to 
these two factors and highlights the types of co-operative strategies that emerge between 
them. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Incumbent manufacturers, typically following a demand-pull strategy, entered highly 
structured co-operative relationships with ‘general’ installers to reinforce and expand control 
over mainstream markets and existing customers. New-entrant manufacturers, typically 
following a technology-push strategy, developed unstructured co-operative relationships with 
(mainly)  ‘specialist’ installers. This type of co-operation had learning as main objective, and 
the development of leading-edge applications of fibre-optics technology also constituted an 
attempt to remove technical and cost-related obstacles to the wider diffusion of the 
technology in the market.  As for installers, both incumbent and new-entrants could choose 
more freely than manufacturers between a demand-pull and a technology-push strategy. 
Those who preferred a demand-pull one entered more structured types of co-operative 
agreements with ‘general’ manufacturers, whereas the ones who opted for the technology-
push strategy were more likely to develop unstructured co-operative agreements with 
‘specialist’ manufacturers.  
 
Finally, some firms - typically new-entrant installers –appear “stuck in the middle”34 at the 
time of the study. These are typically firms with a strong initial focus on the technology but 
that, at some stage in their development, were allured by the possibilities for rapid growth 
offered by the standard applications market. These firms tend to have double strategies and 
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double systems of co-operation, but interview data reveal that the lack of focus and the 
tensions emerging from this duality negatively affect both performance and morale.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was to analyze the types of co-operative strategies adopted by 
incumbents and new-entrants in the wake of a technological discontinuity. A secondary 
objective was to identify potential similarities (and differences) between incumbents and 
new-entrants with respect to co-operation. The context for the research is the UK fibre-optics 
industry, and specific attention has been devoted to the development of co-operative 
strategies between manufacturers and installers of optical communications systems in the 
years 1992-1997.  
 
The study confirms previous findings that highlight the importance of co-operative strategies 
as firm-level responses to technological discontinuities for incumbents35 and also as part of a 
wider entry-strategy for new comers36. It also contributes new evidence to the study of the 
development of new, disruptive technologies and their implications for firm strategies. In line 
with Christensen’s and Rothaermel’s contributions37, it suggests that incumbent firms who 
adopt the new technology tend to apply it to their traditional mainstream markets (demand-
pull strategy), whereas new-entrants tend to concentrate in specialist niches, where leading-
edge applications are explored and developed (technology-push strategy). However, an 
original contribution of the study is to show how the choice between demand-pull and 
technology-push strategies is not directly associated with a firm’s status of incumbent or 
new-entrant, but is also affected by other organizational and technological factors.  For 
example, the importance of sunk-costs and the possibility to re-deploy existing investments 
can play a significant role, as the differences in strategies between incumbent manufacturers 
and installers in the UK optical communications systems industry show. This suggests that 
the impact of a revolutionary technology differs significantly between firms at different levels 
of the same industry supply-chain, and a more careful distinction is called for in future 
studies of incumbents’ reactions to technological discontinuities. 
 
The study also provides a valuable insight into the types of co-operative strategies that 
emerge after a technological discontinuity. The two ideal-types of structured and unstructured 
co-operation constitute distinctive alternatives, and the choice between the two depends on a 
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firm’s long-term strategic objectives as well as on its degree of organizational and 
technological flexibility. Co-operative strategies are, therefore, related to what the firm wants 
to do in the long term as well as to what it can do given its organizational structure and 
capabilities, and its technology. Again, a firm’s status of incumbent or new-entrant is only a 
partial explanatory variable, in that there is no immediate association between the position of 
a specific firm as incumbent or new-entrant and its choice of a structured or unstructured type 
of co-operative strategy. 
 
As for the managerial implications of the study, the relevance of co-operative strategies in 
complex competitive environments is highlighted. In the context of discontinuous 
technological change co-operative strategies offer both incumbents and new-entrants the 
opportunity to shape the competitive game. Co-operation is, in other words, a useful strategy 
for the sustainability of old positions and the creation of new competitive advantage alike.  
 
The study, however, shows that in the context of discontinuous technological change 
different types of co-operation suit different purposes. A better understanding of the factors 
affecting the choice – the strategic driver of the firm and its degree of organizational and 
technological flexibility – as well as of the alternatives available – structured versus 
unstructured co-operation - can benefit managers in their decision-making. Moreover, the two 
ideal-types of structured partnerships and unstructured co-operation offer a valuable insight 
and pave the way for further developments on issues such as strategy implementation and the 
long-term effects of co-operation on competition and firm performance. 
 
Finally, a critical implication of the study is that the pattern of adoption of demand-pull and 
technology-push strategies in the wake of a technological discontinuity, combined with the 
development of consistent types of co-operation, have a significant impact on the direction of 
technological development and on the shape of the future competitive game. As Christensen 
highlighted in his study of the hard-drive disk industry38, the tendency of incumbent firms to 
concentrate on mainstream markets pushes leading-edge developments of the technology in 
specialist niches, often far away from sight. This might pose a significant future threat for 
established firms, if ‘hidden’ technological developments pave the way to wider success in 
the market in the future. Managers of established firms are therefore alerted to these potential 
risks, and should accordingly provide adequate organizational and strategic solutions to keep 
an eye39 on what is going on at the fringes of their industries. 
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TABLE 1. Technological advantages of fibre-optics versus copper-based technology in optical 
communications 
 
BANDWIDTH AND CARRYING  
CAPACITY 
Optical cables provide larger capacity and bandwidth than metallic cables, 
so that tens of thousands of simultaneous channels can be transmitted and 
received 
 
TRANSMISSION LOSSES Optical cables suffer lower transmission losses than metallic cables, and 
decrease the need for signal amplification 
 
WEIGHT Optical cables weigh far less than metallic cables, and also take up less 
space 
 
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE Optical cables are immune from electromagnetic interference (crucial 
in specialist applications, mainly for the military and aerospace) 
 
SAFETY Optical cables are safer than metallic cables (crucial in hazardous areas) 
 
Sources: Charin (1983), Miyazaki (1995) 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Measures of interfirm co-operation 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
PROCESS 
OPERATIONAL 
MEASURE 
Description 
 
CO-ORDINATION AND 
CAPABILITIES 
INTEGRATION 
 
Teamwork across 
organizational 
boundaries 
 
 
The higher the degree of teamwork (across a wide spectrum of 
activities, from design to installation) the more co-operative the 
relationship 
  
Span of selection 
criteria 
 
The wider the span, including criteria that go beyond past 
performance to include factors such as potential for innovation, 
technological capabilities, ease of communication, and managerial 
practices, the more co-operative the relationship 
 
 
COMMITMENT AND 
INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE 
 
Commitment to the 
relationship and 
information 
exchange  
 
The level of commitment and information exchange is measured in 
terms of the adoption of practices such as exchange of  strategically 
sensitive information, idiosyncratic investments in tangible and 
intangible assets, open books, and exchange of personnel 
 
 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Span of 
performance 
evaluation criteria 
and type of 
monitoring 
mechanisms 
 
The wider the span, including criteria such as contribution to 
innovation, the more co-operative the relationship.  As for 
mechanisms, aspects such as the degree of formality/informality of 
the evaluation are taken into account 
 
  
Role of the contract 
 
Written down or in oral form, as a means to specify the expectations 
of the parties  
 
  
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
 
Use of legal enforcement versus trust-based mechanisms. The 
higher the degree of ‘voice’ in conflict resolution, the higher the 
reliance on trust and the more co-operative the relationship  
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TABLE 3. Behavioral patterns of co-operation in supply relationships 
 STRUCTURED 
 CO-OPERATION 
UNSTRUCTURED 
CO-OPERATION 
Key areas for co-operation 
in supply relationships 
  
 
Teamwork across 
organizational boundaries 
Suppliers are heavily involved at 
the early stages of the overall 
production process and co-
ordination is mainly achieved by 
means of system integration 
Suppliers are involved but the 
relationship is not formalized in 
structures. Their involvement is 
based on social interactions at 
the individual level that lead to 
high relational capital 
 
Supplier selection 
Selection is based on a wide 
range of criteria (expressing both 
past performance and future 
potential) in order to secure a 
high degree of organizational fit, 
promote efficiency and reduce 
control and conflict resolution 
costs 
Selection is important but 
organizational fit is not the 
priority. A certain amount of 
diversity and non-
complementarity is required to 
generate new knowledge. 
Criteria that express ‘potential’ 
are preferred to criteria based on 
past performance 
 
Commitment to supplier and 
information exchange 
High degree of commitment at 
the organizational level, that 
leads to high relation specific 
investments and the creation of 
idiosyncratic relationship 
knowledge 
Low degree of commitment at 
the organizational level but high 
at the individual level, which 
leads to high relational capital 
 
Supplier’s performance 
evaluation 
 
Predominantly formal and 
structured, based on a check-list 
of different criteria 
 
Mainly informal and 
unstructured. The overall 
assessment of the relationship 
prevails on evaluation of 
performance in specific areas 
 
Role of the contract 
The relationship is between 
‘organizations’. The contract 
plays a fundamental role in 
defining the operational rules and 
making the expectations of the 
parties explicit. It is used as a 
safeguard 
The relationship is between 
‘people’. The contract is 
relatively unimportant, whereas 
trust-based personal relationships 
are key elements 
 
Conflict resolution 
Heavily engineered integrative 
conflict management. Going 
back to the contract as the basis 
of re-negotiation is the norm 
Informal integrative conflict 
management. Relational capital 
is the fundamental mechanism. 
The contract is typically ‘left 
aside’ 
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FIGURE 1. UK OPTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INDUSTRY: SUPPLY-CHAIN (Sources: Frost and Sullivan, 
1992)
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FIGURE 2. MATRIX: STRATEGY-POSITION
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FIGURE 3. Co-operative strategies in the UK optical communications systems industry: a generalization
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